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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

***
LA VOR J. COATES
PlaintiffAppellant

vs.
Case No. 1 7344
MARY COATES
DefendantRespondent

***
APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF NATURE OF THE CASE
Plaintiff-husband appeals the distribution of the property
of the parties and an alimony award, as determined by the trial court,
and set forth by the Decree of Divorce entered by the court.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
After the trial of this matter, the court entered its decree,
wherein the property of the parties was distributed in accordance
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with the findings of the court.

In addition, the court entered an award

of alimony in favor of the defendant.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff-appellant seeks to have the property disposition
set aside and reversed, and the matter remanded to the district court
for reconsideration of the property division.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The parties were married on June 26, 1969, and lived as
husband and wife until their separation on approximately December 3,
197 5.

One minor child was born as issue of the marriage.
The court found that each party had brought to the marriage

certain property (R-180), the plaintiff having brought into the marriage
a truck and camper shell, stock worth approximately $630, a Credit
Union account of approximately $2, 100, an investment account of
approximately $1, 000, and his personal possessions.

That defendant

brought to the marriage a home on Bryan Avenue, Salt Lake City,
Utah; $4, 000 cash; furniture;

a 1966 Chevrolet automobile, and

2
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her personal possessions.
The transcript shows that plaintiff testified that he brought
into the marriage a pickup truck, a crunper, a boat, a 1963 Chevrolet
automobile, stock with a value of $630. 54, a checking account with a
balance of $3, 807, a Credit Union accoWlt with a balance of $2, 100,
and a mutual fund investment of $1, 200 (T-73, 74, 75, 76).

Further,

the transcript shows that the defendant brought to the marriage a
1966 Chevrolet automobile, and an interest in a home on Bryan
Avenue (T-76).

Plaintiff testified that the home on Bryan Avenue

was later deeded by defendant's parents to both plaintiff and the
defendant (T- 77), and that the parties did extensive remodeling to
said home (T-77), after which the house was sold, and approximately
$20, 200 applied towards the purchase of the parties home on ThWlderbird Drive (T-79).
Durin

r

the marriage, the parties, in addition to acquiring

the home ~n Thunderbird Drive, traded plaintiff's pickup truck for a
1961 pickup truck (T-79), sold plaintiff's boat, and used the proceeds
to purchase a Sea Ray boat (T-83), purchase a vacant lot in Granger,

3
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Utah (T-79); purchased furniture (T-85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91);
and accumulated and purchased jewelry (T-94, 95.) In addition, the
parties accumulated two 1977 Buick automobiles (T-105, 133),
having sold the two Chevrolet automobiles brought into the marriage
(T-107.)

In addition to the accumulation of the foregoing property,
the evidence established that plaintiff had a Credit Union account of
approximately $6, 000 (T-116;

Ex. 44-D, 45-P), and a retirement

account of approximately $3, 000 (T-98; Ex. 16-D.) Defendant had
acquired an ffiA retirement account of $7, 500.

The parties also

purchased and owned some stock, part of which was sold about the
time of the separation of the parties (T-121, 132.)
Defendant testified that her father had assisted the parties
financially during the years of the marriage, and that there was
$7, 500 owed to him (T-142.) This amount represented $1, 500 used
to purchase the vacant lot in Granger, and $6, 000 borrowed to
remodel the Thunderbird Drive home.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

4

The court, after presentation of the evidence, found that
~he

home on Thunderbird Drive was valued at $148, 0'00 (R-179), with

no outstanding encumbrances; that plaintiff's pension plan with Hughes
Airwest had an approximate value of $3, 300; that defendant's ffiA
account was approximately $7, 000 (R-180); and that certain bills
existed, including $7, 500 to defendant's father;

however, according

to the exhibits presented (44-D and 45-P), the total property
accumulated by the parties consisted of additional properties not
considered by the court in its Findings of Fact.

Values of these

properties, as shown by the exhibits, are:
VALUE BY
PLAINTIFF

ruM
Home - 2759 Thunderbird

$

170,000.00

VALUE BY
DEFENDANT
$

148, 100.00

Building lot - Granger

15, 000. 00

22, 500. 00

Boat

10,900.00

13, 000. 00

2, 000. 00

2, 700. 00

Pickup and camper
Furniture and personal
property
Jewelry of defendant

37, 822. 00

None

16, 000. 00 to
25,000.00

None

5
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VALUE BY
PLAINTIFF

ITEM
Jewelry of plaintiff

$

Stock owned and/ or sold

300. 00 to
500.00

VALUE BY
DEFENDANT

$
500.00

8 55. 00

3, 084. 00

1, 500. 00 to
3,000.00

1,712.00

Retirement accounts

3,000.00

7, 200. 00

Savings or Credit Union
accounts

6,000.00

None

Stocks in possession

TOTALS
(Smallest claimed)

$ 263, 277. 00

$ 187, 096. 00

Notwithstanding the amounts claimed by the parties, the
court in its Conclusions of Law and in the Decree of Divorce made a
disposition of the property.

It is from this property disposition that

plaintiff appeals.
POINTS ON APPEAL
POINT I.

THAT THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
IN THE DIVISION OF MARITAL ASSETS.

POINT II.

THAT THE COURT ERRED IN AWARDING
ATTORNEY'S FEES TO DEFENDANT.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THAT THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
THE DIVISION OF MARITAL ASSETS.
In its Findings of Fact, the court did not find a value of all

or the property of the parties, but found a value for only the home
on Thunderbird Drive.

In making the division of property, the court

did not consider the defendant's own testimony that she felt that a
60/ 40 division of the house would be fair (T-139).

Considering the

values as established by the testimony and exhibits, and applying
defendant's values, the decree awards the property, as follows:
TO PLAINTIFF:
Home lien

TO DEFENDANT:
$

27,000.00

Building lot
(value less
$1, 500. 00 to
defendant's
father)

21,000.00

Boat

13,000.00

Truck/ camper

Home
($148, 100. 00,
less lien, and
less $6, 000. 00
to defendant's
father)

$

115,100.00

2,700.00
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TO PLAINTIFF:
Pension plan

TO DEFENDANT:

$

Credit Union

3, 200. 00

$

7, 000.

$

122, JOO.

6,000.00

Stock proceeds

855.00

Jewelry

500.00
$

68, 655. 00

I

Thus, it can be seen that the court, without considering the value oi
defendant's household furniture, jewelry and stock, awarded the
defendant 64o/o of the assets of the marriage.

Had the court consider;

that the furniture had the value placed by plaintiff at $37, 722. 00; the
plaintiff's jewelry at $16, 000. 00;

and her stock at $4, 796. 08, the

amount she was awarded would then be $180, 618. 08, and the ratio
would then be: plaintiff - 27o/o, and defendant - 73%.
While it is recognized that no fixed formula exists by whic~
the court is required to distribute the assets of a marriage, the
disposition should be fair, equitable, and necessary for the parties.
Fletcher v. Fletcher, 615 P. 2d 1218.

8
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Since the marital estate is evaluated according to the
existing property interests at the time the matter is heard by the
court, appellant contends that the court should have considered
the value of all of the marital assets, including furniture, jewelry
and stock values.

See Jesperson v. Jesperson, 610 P. 2d 326;

Hamilton v. Hamilton, 562 P. 2d 235.

The court, in making its

division, did not consider these items, although they constituted
a very substantial part of the assets accumulated during the
marriage.
The court in its Conclusions of Law indicated _that the
division of the home was made after a consideration of the credits
and offsets to which each party may be entitled.

Assuming that

the court considered as an offset, in favor of defendant, the work
performed by her father, all of which •_vas done during the
marriage, it would appear that this claim has no more validity
than did the defendant's claim for labor performed by him in the
case of Jesperson v. Jesperson, supra.

Thus, considering the
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value of the home, the fact that it was unencumbered, and the facr
that the parties had both worked toward its acquisition, it appears
that the disposition by the court was neither fair, equitable or
necessary for the parties, and was an abuse of the court's
discretion.
Appellant further contends that the court abused its
discretion in its division of property, by not considering the
marital misconduct of the defendant.

It is acknowledged that the

settlement of property should not impose a punishment on either
party; however, marital misconduct often is considered by the
court in making an equitable division of property.

See Wilson v.

Wilson, 1956 Ut, 296 P. 2d 977.
In the matter of Read v. Read, 1979 Ut, 594 P. 2d 871,
this court said:
It is well established that the trial court has

considerable discretion in the allocation of the
property and financial resources of the parties.
Nevertheless, this discretion is not entirely
without limit.
In the case before us, it appears that the trial

court's property award may reflect a degree of

10
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punishment against the defendant for his extramarital conduct and relative "guilt" in bringing
about the dissolution of the marriage. A trial
court must consider many factors in making
a property settlement in a divorce proceeding,
but the purpose of the settlement should not be
to impose punishment upon either party.
It appears, notwithstanding the fact that defendant's conduct

caused the marriage to fail, that the court did not consider this
and, in fact, by its distribution of the property, effectively punished
the appellant.

An equal distribution of all of the assets would have

more realistically and more equitably solved the problems faced
by the court.

Considering the facts of this case, appellant submits that
it is reasonable for this court to exercise its own prerogative and
modify the Decree of Divorce to provide for a distribution of
assets that will more reasonably serve the desired objective of
making the best possible allocation of the property to allow the
parties to readjust their lives.
POINT II
THAT THE COURT ERRED IN AWARDING ATTORNEY'S
FEES TO DEFENDANT.
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Appellant recognizes that the amount, if any, of
attorney's fees awarded to a wife in a divorce case, rests in the
sound discretion of the trial court; however, it is submitted that
such an award must be based both upon the financial need of the
wife and upon the ability of the husband to pay.

It is also recog-

nized that the wife is not entitled to free litigation, and that the
court should consider this fact.
Here, the defendant wife was awarded a substantial
portion of the assets of the marriage and, in addition, was
awarded alimony in the sum of $400 per month for a period of
one year.

This award was made, although defendant was receiving

unemployment compensation of $137 per week (T-130), and had
been working at a salary of $2, 500 per month (T-152, 178). There
was neither a showing by the defendant or a finding by the court
that defendant-wife was in need of assistance for the payment oi
attorney's fees, nor was there a showing by the defendant or a
finding by the court that the wife was financially unable to pay her
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own attorney's fees.

From the facts, it is also obvious that the

financial resources of the appellant husband would be severely
burdened by the court's award of attorney's fees.
This court addressed this question in the case of
Weiss v. Weiss, 111 Ut. 353, 179 P. 2d 1005, wherein the court
said:
... that awards of attorney's fees and expenses
of suit may be made by the trial court ... ,
providing the necessity for such awards is found
to exist. (Emphasis mine. )
Again, the court in Adams v. Adams, Ut 1979, 593 P. 2d
147, said:
An award of attorney's fees is largely discretionary
with this court, and as the record shows that
plaintiff is working and earning money, and does
not disclose any necessity on the part of the plaintiff
for such award or her inability to pay her own
attorney's fees . . . (Emphasis mine. )
There is nothing before the court that would indicate
defendant-wife's inability to pay her own fees, or a necessity
requiring the husband to pay them; on the contrary, the wife
not only had assets, but also had income sufficient to pay these
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expenses.

Accordingly, it is submitted that the trial court

abused its discretion in awarding the wife attorney's fees of
$1, 500.

CONCLUSION
A review of the disposition of assets made by the court,
together with the award of attorney's fees, seems to show that tlle
trial court did not fully consider the contributions of the parties
to the accumulation of marital assets, nor did the court
consider the facts underlying the divorce.
It is respectfully submitted that this court should review

and revise the division of property so that a more reasonable
and realistic distribution will exist.

Appellant believes that

the most applicable method would be to increase- his interest in
the home to an amount that would reflect an equitable distribution
of all of the marital assets.
Further, it is submitted that the court should reverse
the lower court's award of attorney's fees to the defendant,
based upon the facts which clearly show the lack of her need
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for such award, and also show her absolute ability to pay these
fees.

/J 7

71!: day of
Respectfully submitted this-~&~~----March 1981.
WALTER R. ELLETT

Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant

Mailed three (3) copies of the foregoing Appellant's Brief to
Kent !VI. Kasting, Gustin, Adams, Kasting & Liapis, 1000 Boston
Building, 9 Exchange Place, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this
.::;' '7 !7/'
day of March 1981,
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